Acquisition of Econ Healthcare (Asia) Limited by TPG Inc.

Reference:

CCCS 400-140-2025-008

Notifying Party:

TPG Inc.

Notifying Date:

29 August 2025

Summary of Transaction: 

a.   the names of the merger parties;

The merger parties in this transaction are TPG Inc. (“TPG”) and Econ Healthcare (Asia) Limited (now known as Econ Healthcare (Asia) Pte. Ltd.) (“Econ Healthcare”), (collectively, the “Parties”).

b.   a description of the transaction;

The notification relates to the acquisition by Enabler BidCo, which is indirectly solely controlled by TPG, of all the issued ordinary shares in the capital of Econ Healthcare, in accordance with Section 210 of the Companies Act 1967 of Singapore and the Singapore Code on Take-overs and Mergers (the “Transaction”).

c.   a description of the business activities of the merger parties worldwide and in Singapore;

TPG

TPG is a global investment firm founded in 1992. It has offices worldwide, including in Singapore, and has been present in Asia since 1994. TPG invests in companies across a broad range of industries and geographies, and its investment platforms span across a wide range of asset classes. 

The controlled portfolio companies of TPG’s group of companies (the “TPG Group”) comprise Invest Healthcare Pte. Ltd. and its subsidiaries (collectively, the “Invest Healthcare Group”). The Invest Healthcare Group provides eldercare services in Singapore, including operating the chain of Orange Valley nursing homes, and providing non-residential care services.

Econ Healthcare

Econ Healthcare and its subsidiaries (collectively, the “Econ Healthcare Group”) is a private nursing home operator in Singapore and Malaysia, and also has presence in China. In Singapore, the Econ Healthcare Group operates eight medicare centres and nursing homes, and also provides non-residential care services.

d.   a description of the overlapping goods or services, including brand names;

The Econ Healthcare Group and the Invest Healthcare Group overlap in the provision of residential nursing home services, with a de minimis overlap in the provision of non-residential care services, to the elderly in Singapore 

e.   a description of substitute goods or services from demand-side and supply-side considerations;

Residential nursing home services

(a)   From a demand-side perspective, residential nursing homes are operated by private operators and voluntary welfare organisations (“VWOs”).

(b)   From a supply-side perspective, healthcare service providers in Singapore can switch to supplying residential nursing home services for the elderly. 

Non-residential care services

(a)   For the provision of non-residential care services, from a demand-side perspective, non-residential care services are provided by private service providers and VWOs.

(b)   From a supply-side perspective, healthcare service providers generally have the ability to switch to provide non-residential care services. 

a.   the applicant’s views on:

       i.   definition of the relevant market(s);

TPG considers that the relevant markets for the purposes of this notification are: 

(a)   The market for the supply of residential nursing homes in Singapore; and

(b)   The market for the supply of non-residential care services in Singapore 

       i.   the way in which competition functions in this market;

Residential nursing home services

The residential nursing home services market in Singapore is competitive with a multitude of private operators and VWOs. The operators compete on a range of value propositions and locations to address the residents’ needs. There are various factors of consideration by customers when choosing between nursing homes, with the key criteria generally being nursing quality, cleanliness, condition of the facility and food quality. With respect to price competition, the market is highly regulated in terms of price. 

Non-residential care services

The market players would generally also compete on a range of value propositions, and a list of characteristics that customers may consider in their choice of service provider includes nursing quality, cleanliness, food quality, ease of administration / coordination, and affiliations with hospital. As for prices, these are similarly effectively regulated.

     ii.   barriers to entry and countervailing buyer power; and

Residential nursing home services

(a)   The market is characterised by significant Singapore Government efforts to proactively sponsor, or lower any barriers, for new entry and expansion to meet the needs of a rapidly ageing population in Singapore.

(b)   Residents of nursing homes can, and do, switch between nursing home operators (both private operators and VWOs).

Non-residential care services

(a)   Existing competitors are able to expand their business capacity, and new entrants are able to enter the market. There are no specific licences required for the provision of non-residential care services, and there is similarly strong support from the Singapore Government to expand the capacity in this market.

(b)   Individuals who require non-residential care services can switch between different service providers. 

      iii.   the competitive effects of the merger (non-coordinated, coordinated and/or vertical effects, as relevant).

Non-coordinated effects

The Transaction will not give rise to any non-coordinated effects, for the following reasons:

(a)   in respect of the residential nursing home services market in Singapore: (1) the multitude of VWOs and private operators; (2) the ease of entry or expansion as facilitated by the Singapore Government; (3) the ability of customers to switch between nursing home operators (both VWOs and private operators); and (4) the regulatory constraints imposed by the Ministry of Health in respect of prices and quality of services; and

(b)   in respect of the non-residential care services market: (1) the multitude of existing competitors; (2) the ease of entry or expansion as facilitated by the Singapore Government; and (3) the ability of customers to switch between different service providers.

Coordinated effects

The Transaction will not give rise to any coordinated effects, for the following reasons:

(a)   in respect of the residential nursing home services market in Singapore: (1) the presence of numerous existing competitors; (2) the differentiated services by operators and the fact that a significant proportion of operators are VWOs, which act as a constraint on the ability to arrive at any agreed pricing or coordinated outcomes; (3) the Ministry of Health’s regulation of prices of subsidised beds, which limits the ability to freely determine prices; and (4) the referral process carried out by the Agency of Integrated Care for subsidised residents, which limits the ability to retaliate through customer acquisition; and

(b)   in respect of the non-residential care services market in Singapore: (1) the presence of numerous existing competitors; (2) the ability of customers to switch; and (3) the ease of entry or expansion facilitated by the Singapore Government.

Vertical and conglomerate effects

The Transaction would not give rise to any vertical effects, as there are no past or existing vertical relationships between the TPG Group (including its controlled portfolio companies) and the Econ Healthcare Group. 

The Transaction would also not give rise to any conglomerate effect as it does not significantly add to the range of services that the Invest Healthcare Group already offers prior to the Transaction.

Decision:

9 October 2025

Following its assessment, CCS has concluded that the Transaction has not infringed the section 54 prohibition of the Competition Act 2004.

Read the Announcement.

Read the Grounds of Decision.